What our guys knew then that our pundit/cheerleader types don't know now:

By Tom Blackburn
Palm Beach Post Columnist

Monday, January 08, 2007

As a crafty politician, Franklin D. Roosevelt knew how to turn acquaintances into supporters by making them feel like friends. His touch rarely failed.

In 1938, the Army's chief of staff and his deputy, Gen. George C. Marshall, were at a White House meeting attended by some administration senior figures. After holding forth a while, FDR turned to the junior man in the room, Gen. Marshall, and asked, "Don't you think so, George?"

"I'm sorry, Mr. President," said Gen. Marshall emphasizing Roosevelt's title, "but I don't agree with that at all."

Whew. That could have been a career-killer for an ambitious officer. Instead, when the war in Europe began a year later, Roosevelt reached past more senior officers to make Gen. Marshall Army chief of staff, a post that effectively commanded the biggest army in the nation's history. Far from having ruined his career, Gen. Marshall went on be secretary of state under President Truman. He became the third secretary of the new Defense Department after the first two appointees in that job didn't work out. He is the only general ever to win a Nobel Peace Prize. That was for his role in the rebuilding of Europe after World War II.

And FDR never called the general "George" in public again.

A patriot has to wonder whether we'd be waist-deep in Iraq if Gen. George Marshall were still around. It's hard to believe that any of the top World War II commanders, especially Gen. Marshall, and his splenetic naval counterpart, Adm. Ernest King, would have quietly accepted ex-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's anemic manpower levels.

One current general did object. He happened to hold the same title Gen. Marshall held during World War II, but the job itself was downgraded during past Pentagon reorganizations. The service chiefs lost clout to the chairman of the joint chiefs, who is now more than a first among equals. That job was held in 2002 by Gen. Tommy Franks, who, according to Bob Woodward in Plan of Attack, referred to the service chiefs as "Title X (four-syllable bleep)s" after the law that kept their posts but reduced their power.

The Army's Title X (four-syllable bleep) was Gen. Eric Shinseki. He got into trouble with Mr. Rumsfeld almost right away by objecting to the secretary's plans to reduce the size of the Army by replacing troops with laptop computers. In typical bureaucratic knife-fighting, someone chose Gen. Shinseki's successor, and someone leaked the fact, 14 months before the general's term was due to expire. The signal was that Gen. Shinseki would be a non-player for his last year in office.

Before the U.S. attacked Iraq, Gen. Shinseki told a Senate committee that the looming Iraq adventure would take "something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers." He specified that they would be needed to restore order after Saddam Hussein was gone.

Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who seems to have learned about military manpower while enjoying student deferments for the Vietnam War, pronounced Gen Shinseki's estimates "far off the mark." He said it was "hard to believe" that very many troops would be needed when the ground war ended.

That, of course, was then. And this is now. Some of the generals who dutifully reported, as requested, that they had enough troops are retiring, and President Bush has new requests for his new team: Find some more soldiers and Marines and send more troops in a surge to Baghdad. Both needs, of course, Gen. Shinseki predicted and Mr. Wolfowitz found hard to believe.

The politicians, led by Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Wolfowitz, stayed away from Gen. Shinseki's retirement ceremony, missing the chance to honor him for 38 years of service. Mr. Bush sent Mr. Wolfowitz and whatever he can believe off with honors to the World Bank.

The lesson of Iraq is not that the military services no longer have officers who are worth their stars. Gen. Shinseki knew what he was about. And there were others. The problem was elsewhere.

It doesn't help to have good generals if civilian leaders only want team players in their group photos. FDR knew he wasn't getting a yes-man with Gen. Marshall. He didn't look for one. He sought good advice instead. That's how he got it. It's why we won that war.